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Abstract 
 
A significant part of bank lending in the UK is secured on commercial property and valuations 
play an important part in this process.  They are an integral part of risk management within the 
banking sector.  It is therefore important that valuations are independent and objective and are 
used properly to ensure that secured lending is soundly based from the perspective of both lender 
and borrower.  The purpose of this research is to examine objectivity and transparency in the 
valuation process for bank lending and to identify any influences which may undermine the 
process.  A detailed analysis of 31 valuation negligence cases has been followed by two focus 
groups of  lenders and valuers and also questionnaire surveys of commercial lenders and valuers. 
 
Many stakeholders exist, for example lenders, borrowers and brokers, who are able to influence 
the process in various ways.   The strongest evidence of overt influence in the process comes 
from the method of valuer selection with borrowers and brokers seen to be heavily involved.  
There is some also some evidence of influence during the draft valuation process.  A significant 
minority of valuers feel that inappropriate pressure is applied by borrowers and brokers yet there 
is no apparent part of the process that leads to this.   
 
The panel system employed by lenders is found to be a significant part of the system and merits 
further examination.  The pressure felt by valuers needs more investigation along with the 
question of if and how the process could dispel such feelings.  This is seen as particularly 
important in the context of bank regulation. 
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1.   Introduction  
A significant part of bank lending in the UK is underpinned by commercial property as security 
for loans.  According to DTZ (2004), commercial real estate debt now accounts for 13.6% of 
commercial loan books and 7.5% of the total loan books of the banks.   
 
Valuations play an integral part in this lending process. They underpin individual lending 
decisions and are also an integral part of capital adequacy systems which attempt to manage the 
risks taken by lenders.   Capital adequacy is the system by which it is determined how much 
capital a bank is required to hold. It is important to banks as capital is expensive to maintain.  The 
amount required is related to the value of the bank’s assets which, in the case of secured loans, is 
the value of the loans. The current approach to capital adequacy in the UK is based on the 1988 
Capital Accord produced by Basel (1988) and the relevant EU Directives. Under the Accord, an 
institution is required to hold less capital to support assets with low credit risk weights than assets 
with higher risk weights.  Currently, lending on commercial property carries a 100% weighting as 
it has historically been seen as high risk. 
 
A second Capital Accord and associated EU directives, recommending new capital requirements, 
are expected to be in place by the end of 2006.  This new framework is designed to encourage 
banks to be more analytical about the risks they routinely carry, and to allow lower risk 
weightings when evidence shows that they are adopting sound risk management policies.  
 
Under Basel’s new standardized approach, an ‘exceptional treatment’ is introduced to allow some 
commercial secured lending to qualify for a 50% weighting provided it meets rigid criteria, one of 
which is prescriptive valuation rules. To qualify, the loan to value ratio must be the lower of 50% 
of Market Value (MV) or 60% of Mortgage Lending Value (MLV); the qualities of competence 
and independence for valuers are also stipulated.  These requirements clearly have implications 
for valuation practice.  
 
There is an alternative to the standardized approach in the new Accord, as credit institutions have 
the option to adjust their own funds to actual risks by a new internal ratings based approach. This 
method allows for the capital requirements to be raised or lowered by a substantial amount 
depending, in part, upon the systems used to assess risk. As part of these systems, the quality of 
valuation procedures in secured lending could be influential.  
 
Due to the reliance placed on valuations in both individual decision making and in capital 
adequacy requirements, there is a need for objective, accurate valuations procured through a 
transparent process.  Any undue influences within the process which affect the operation of the 
system or the outcome need to be identified and procedures put in place to rectify any 
deficiencies. 
 
In the UK, valuations for loan purposes are usually carried out by members of a self-regulating 
professional body, the Royal Institution for Chartered Surveyors (RICS), which is the provider of 
both mandatory and other practice statements, guidance notes and information papers.  It also has 
policing powers under a disciplinary code.  The RICS valuation practice manual attempts to 
formalise the whole valuation process; from appointment of the valuer through bases of valuation 
to reporting standards, although not methods. 
 
The study by Baum et al (2000) on the property investment performance measurement valuation 
process in the UK led to the RICS setting up the Carsberg Working Party (RICS, 2002) to 
consider the influence issues raised. Although there were some specific recommendations 
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regarding secured lending, most of the Working Party’s recommendations related to performance 
measurement valuations. The current research programme was commenced to extend the 
investigations from periodic to one-off valuations such as lending valuations.  The overall aim of 
this particular paper is to examine objectivity and transparency in the bank lending valuation 
process in the UK and to identify any influences which may undermine the process.   
 
2.   Literature review 
Influence on valuations can arise from overt external pressure, such as from a client or another 
stakeholder in the transaction.  Alternatively it may arise from bias due to the valuer’s concerns 
regarding a relationship with the client or stakeholder.  Such bias may be unconscious or 
conscious on the part of the valuer.  A third form of influence is also behavioural, but it is not 
related to clients and does not involve moral hazards, it may, however, have an impact on the 
outcome of a valuation.  The first two types of influence are the most relevant to this study and 
the literature is reviewed below. The third form of influence is important but is beyond the remit 
of this particular work. 
  
Influence of clients and stakeholders 
3rd party involvement in selection of the valuer 
In the context of a secured lending transaction, the primary purpose of a valuation is to provide 
the lender with at least part of the essential material on which to base an informed lending 
decision. It might be thought, therefore, that a lender (as the party most at risk from an inaccurate 
valuation) would routinely seek both to select the valuer and to control the terms of the valuer’s 
appointment. In such circumstances the lender and valuer would be linked by a contract for 
professional services and their mutual rights and obligations could be clearly defined. 
 
However, it is apparent that, in practice, this approach is not always adopted. In particular, 
lenders may rely on valuations commissioned and/or paid for by borrowers. Crosby et al (1998a) 
found that some lenders routinely permit the borrower to be involved in selecting the valuer. In 
such circumstances there is inevitably a possibility that the resulting valuation may be influenced 
by the borrower to the detriment of the lender 
 
Overt influence 
The problem of client influence has been the subject of studies in several countries.  Kinnard, et 
al (1997) in the US found that valuers would change their valuations when requested by clients.  
Smolen and Hambleton (1997) found that valuers were sometimes pressured to alter valuations, 
and that banks were the main category of clients that were applying such pressure.  Levy and 
Shuck (1999) also found that large fund manager clients influenced the valuation outcome in 
periodic valuations in New Zealand.   
 
In the UK, Baum et al (2000) found evidence of client influence affecting the production of 
periodic fund valuations within the property investment market. Subsequently, as already noted, 
the RICS Valuation Faculty set up a Working Party under Sir Brian Carsberg, to consider whether 
various aspects of the provision of valuations gave cause for concern and to make 
recommendations as to how any such concerns should be allayed.  The Carsberg Report (RICS, 
2002) recognised that some interaction between clients and valuers is essential to the production 
of high quality valuations, not least because clients are likely to have information crucial to the 
valuation that they are best placed to provide. Nevertheless, the Committee was clearly concerned 
about the risks of client influence on valuations, and made recommendations for changes to RICS 
guidance to ensure transparency.  The Report concluded that the secured lending context provided 
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both the motives and the opportunities for attempts to influence valuations, and recommended 
that the RICS should undertake an investigation of this area of valuation practice. 
 
A particular aspect of the study by Baum et al (2000) concerned the valuation production process. 
They found ample evidence to support their conclusion that clients were able to, and did, 
influence valuations through a process of discussion and possible moderation before the formal 
submission of the report. This process frequently involved a meeting at which draft valuations 
would be submitted and discussed and at which, it was found, valuers could be subjected to 
pressure from clients to change those valuations. Levy and Schuck (1999) found the same process 
of draft valuation meetings operating in New Zealand. 
 
 
Bias 
One area of behavioural research which is central to the bank lending process concerns the 
provision of price information to the valuer before the valuation is undertaken.  Gronow et al 
(1996) recommended that valuers should not be provided with the purchase price as it affected 
their opinion of value. Gallimore (1996) did not find that valuers with purchase price knowledge 
came to their opinion earlier in the process than those who did not know the purchase price, but 
this does not exclude the possibility that the provision of this information changed the approach 
and/or the outcome. Havard (2001) experimented on a group of appraisal students and found that 
purchase price knowledge did bias the result towards the price, as did the way in which the 
comparables were presented to the students. Other related research on this area includes studies of 
asking price affecting the outcome of a negotiation of price (Black and Diaz, 1996). 
 
Intuitively, as the definition of MV is the exchange price, it would not be surprising if valuers 
changed the nature of the question, when valuing for loan purposes, to an attempt to confirm price 
rather than carry out a valuation strictly in accordance with the Market Value basis of valuation. 
The valuation accuracy and variation literature (see, for example, Matysiak and Wang (1995) in 
the UK; Fisher et al, (1999) in the US) could validate this approach, as market value can be taken 
from a point in a distribution of possible outcomes and valuers are only identifying whether price 
is within the distribution.  Where influence or pressure is brought to bear on the valuer by clients 
or stakeholders in the valuation, valuation variation can be used as part of the pressure, especially 
if the desired change is argued to be within the accepted distribution of values. [Both legally as it 
is within the margin of error and conceptually as there is no such thing as a ‘correct’ valuation, 
only a distribution of possible outcomes].  
 
Gallimore and Wolverton (2000) investigated the effect of knowledge of prospective purchase 
price on a group of mortgage valuers in the UK. They found that a significant minority of valuers 
did modify the valuation objective to price confirmation rather than market value. However, they 
suggested that the decision to change to price confirmation is not always due to overt pressure 
from the client but can also be self-induced. The valuer may simply assume that the client’s 
objective is to achieve a valuation equal to the purchase price to expedite the transaction and react 
accordingly.  
 
There are other studies that have shown how business concerns can affect the valuer.  Hansz 
(2004) presented mortgage valuers with different scenarios and found that higher valuations were 
being provided by valuers who were given information suggesting that their valuation had 
implications for future business from the client.  Gwin and Maxam (2002) provided a theoretical 
justification for the proposition that rewarding valuers with future work can lead a valuer to 
overstate the value of a property if so required by the lender.  
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There is also a literature on behavioural influences on valuers, which are not client based and do 
not involve moral hazards but which may have an impact on the outcome of a valuation. For 
example, experiments have been undertaken on the selection and presentation of comparables and 
the ordering of events within the actual production of the valuation compared to a normative 
model (Diaz et al, 2002; Havard, 2001).  As already noted, these are outside the scope of this 
particular study however Black et al (2000) reviewed much of this behavioural research and 
suggested further avenues for research in this field. 
 
3.   Research questions and methods 
The discussion above raises a number of issues to be addressed.  Whilst the project from which 
this paper is drawn is wide ranging, this paper is concentrating on an examination of the valuation 
process for commercial secured lending in order to determine the potential areas of influence that 
may provide threats to transparency and objectivity. 
 
These specific questions are addressed under the following headings: 
 
• Selection of the valuer 
• Information as influence 
• Influence on outcomes 
 
The full research programme includes three different analyses: 
 
• An analysis of decided lender-valuer negligence cases 
• Focus groups of lenders and valuers 
• Questionnaire surveys of lenders and valuers 
 
These were conducted sequentially with the earlier analyses providing the framework for the later 
work.  The findings of the analysis of cases and the focus groups and the initial findings of the 
questionnaire surveys are reported in the next section of this paper. 
 
Case analysis 
The analysis of decided valuation negligence cases encompassed 31 involving secured lending on 
commercial (i.e. non-residential) property from Singer & Friedlander v John D Wood (1977) 
onwards; this is believed to cover all the decided cases. The only cases excluded from the 
analysis were those that were not concerned with valuation issues, but were about issues such as 
time limits or the apportioning of damages; in these cases no background information on the 
valuation process was recorded. The database of cases included both reported and unreported 
cases, and the documentation available ranged from full transcripts to limited case summaries. 
 
The cases of alleged valuer negligence, brought by lenders or borrowers, provide a written source 
of practical issues that cause legal problems. Even where it is not part of the litigation, the 
valuation process is often recorded in detail, thus providing an insight into this process in the 
secured lending context. Such cases may not provide a picture that is typical of secured lending 
valuation processes, but analysis of these cases adds to our knowledge and understanding of the 
process and may help to identify where problems of influence typically arise. 
 
Each case was analysed under the headings of the individual research questions identified above. 
This involved tracking and recording the valuation process as far as it could be ascertained from 
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the case documentation. The circumstances were summarised and tabulated under each heading, 
along with any other relevant issue raised in the cases.  
 
Focus groups 
Two discussion groups were organised in the spring of 2003, one group for commercial valuers 
and one for commercial lenders. Each comprised six participants. Both groups were presented 
with the same list of topics, which was based on the research questions arising from the literature 
as developed in the case analysis. This formed the framework for the discussions, which lasted 
two hours. The commercial valuers were all chosen from the London offices of major surveying 
firms, as they would give an insight into secured lending on high value properties in the important 
London market. The commercial lenders were all chosen from the head offices of major UK 
lending institutions, as their experience covered a wide range of property types and locations. 
 
The written records of the focus group discussions were analysed to ascertain whether the major 
issues had been identified in the research questions and whether any new issues had been 
identified.  The analysis also provided data on particular questions as well as determining the 
scope, structure and terminology of the questionnaire surveys. 
 
Questionnaire surveys 
The questionnaires to commercial property lenders and valuers  were carried out during the latter 
part of 2003.  The questions and percentage responses to the relevant questions for this paper 
concerning influence are set out in full in Appendix One. 
 
Lenders 
362 questionnaires were sent to head offices and local branches of organisations that provide 
loans secured on commercial property in the UK.  Firstly, all major lenders included in the 
Property Finance Sourcebook were included (83 destinations) and a sample of other commercial 
lenders was added within the context of a regional matrix (the Standard Government Office 
Regions of England Wales and Scotland) and, within each of these regions, a sample of operators 
located in Metropolitan Districts, Mixed Urban/Rural Districts and Industrial Districts.  This 
included banks, building societies and other specialist lenders.  A total of 79 useable responses 
have been received giving a response rate of 22%.   
 
The nature of the respondents 
Table 1 shows that the majority of respondents come from banks, around half are from the head 
quarters of the lending institution and the majority are UK based rather than lenders with overseas 
head quarters.  Most do not have a professional property qualification (those that do are members 
of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors). 
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Amount of lending 
64 respondents (81%), provided the amount of lending undertaken by the respondent’s 
organisation in the previous 12 months and the total of this was over £14 billion and the number 
of transactions nearly 4,800 (from 63 respondents).  The average amount of lending for each 
respondent was £220 million with an average of 76 transactions. However there a few very large 
lenders amongst the respondents skewing these figures and the median value of lending was £45 
million with the median number of transactions being 30.  
 
Valuers 
569 questionnaires were sent to UK firms.  These firms were chosen as all firms who advertised 
themselves as undertaking commercial valuations within the RICS Directory of Firms.  A total of 
152 useable responses have been received giving a response rate of 27%.    
 
The nature of the respondents 
Partners or directors of the firm account for around 85% of respondents and the rest are heads of 
department, consultants or surveyors ands valuers.  Every single respondent bar one who did not 
respond is professionally qualified with the RICS qualification. 
 
Amount of lending valuation work 
133 (88%) respondents answered the question concerning the amount of commercial lending 
valuation work done out of the office in the last 12 months and the total was over £17.2 billion, 
an average of nearly £130 million for each respondent firm.  A larger number of respondents 
(145, 95%) answered on the number of valuations carried out and this amounted to over 22,400, 
an average of over 150 each.  However, as with the lenders, these means are skewed by a small 
number of very large operators and the median value of work done is £15 million and the median 
number of valuations is 50 per year 
 
4. Research findings 
Selection of the valuer 
A leading commercial valuer, one of the members of the valuers’ focus group, described the 
“ideal scenario” as one where the lender both instructs and pays the valuer directly, and where the 
only valuation report is one addressed directly to the lender. However, it is clear that this “ideal 
scenario” is very far from the norm.  
Table 1 : Respondents and their Organisation 
Type of Lender  Banks  
Bldg Societies    
Other 
82%  
14%  
4% 
UK Office UK H/Q  
UK Branch  
Other  
49%  
43%  
8% 
Location of Head Quarters UK H/Q   
Non-UK H/Q 
71%  
29% 
Professional Property Qualification Yes  
No 
13%  
87% 
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Negligence cases 
Analysis of the negligence case database reveals that third parties were involved in the selection 
and/or appointment of the valuer in 24 out of the 31 cases which concerned commercial property 
(and in 2 of the other 7 cases it was impossible to state whether or not there was third party 
involvement). In 19 of the cases where a third party was involved, this was the borrower; in 5 it 
was a broker.  
 
In some of these cases, the third party involvement went no further than recommending a valuer, 
who was then appointed by the lender. However, some are more extreme, in that the lender never 
issued direct instructions to the valuer at all. Indeed, in one case (Allied Trust Bank Ltd v Edward 
Symmons & Partners (1994)) it was clear that the lender had no direct contact with the valuer at 
any time, and had issued no instructions as to the basis of the valuation. This case was one of 
several in which the valuer clearly had a pre-existing relationship with the borrower, having done 
previous valuations for the borrower which were shown to different lenders.  
 
Focus groups 
The valuers’ focus group acknowledged the need for valuers to maintain a sufficient degree of 
independence to safeguard professional credibility, but claimed that a substantial amount of 
valuation work was dependent on pre-existing relationships with borrowers and/or brokers. The 
point was made that, in large commercial transactions, it would be quite common for a valuer to 
have done substantial preliminary paid work (perhaps including a desktop valuation) for the 
borrower, and for the borrower to want that valuer to carry out the full valuation for the lender. It 
was suggested that lenders were highly likely to accept an existing valuation from a valuer 
introduced by a borrower if that valuer was on the lender’s panel (i.e. the lender’s list of approved 
valuers).   It was also suggested that even an existing valuation from a non-panel valuer might 
well be acceptable. 
 
While the valuers’ focus group saw little cause for concern in the involvement of borrowers in 
valuer selection, brokers were seen in a very different light, at least by those who handled loans in 
excess of £1 million. Brokers operating below that figure were regarded in a better light, and it 
was said that lenders generally liked to deal with them in preference to the often inexperienced 
borrowers. The main criticism of the relatively small group of high-value brokers lay in their 
practice of requesting  desktop valuations from several firms as a means of selecting valuers.  If 
valuers are competing for instructions by reference to the amount of the valuation they may then 
be pressurised to confirm a prior valuation and so this could be a means by which the final 
outcome of the valuation is influenced.  However, it was acknowledged that these brokers were in 
a very powerful position, since they controlled a large slice of the lending market - indeed, some 
lenders were said to be almost entirely dependent on them for their lending business. 
 
Interestingly, the lenders’ focus group expressed far less concern generally about third party 
involvement in the selection of valuers, one member saying that the lender’s credit department 
would always be instructed that the valuation in such circumstances was not to be regarded as 
independent. This group also claimed that their own organisations would always insist on giving 
direct instructions to the valuer, even one originally selected by the borrower.  
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Questionnaires 
Lender survey 
The role of the borrower and broker in the selection process was examined by asking how often 
borrowers or brokers select the valuer and also by a set of scenarios which address either the 
bringing of completed valuations to the lender or requests to appoint particular valuers. 
 
The majority of respondents said that the valuer is seldom (46%) or never (27%) chosen by the 
borrower or broker whilst 14% said it occurred half of the time. Only 2 lenders (3%) gave always 
as a response and 11% said it happened usually.  The circumstances when this could occur are 
heavily dependent on whether the valuer is on the lender’s panel. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the marked difference between the responses of lenders to accepting a 
completed valuation from the borrower depending on whether the valuer is or is not on the panel 
of the lender.  The same pattern of response is seen when a broker presents the valuation, the 
lower % responses are due to the increased level of respondents saying that it doesn’t occur or 
giving no response. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the number of lenders who will appoint a valuer when asked to do so by either 
borrower or broker.  Again the same distinction between the panel and non-panel valuer is 
illustrated. 
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Figure 1: Use of existing valuations by lenders 
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Figure 2: Selection of valuer by borrowers and brokers 
 
Valuer survey 
The responses of the valuers reveal a higher level of involvement by borrowers and brokers in the 
selection process than was indicated by the lenders.  Valuers were asked about who formally 
appoints them and also about the amount of work that is introduced to them by borrowers and 
brokers.  The responses indicate that although the majority of valuations result from formal 
instructions by the lender, the borrower and/or the broker have an influence on that selection.  
The formal appointment of the valuer is made by the lender in an average of 80% of cases, by the 
borrower in 11%, the broker in 3% and both borrower and broker in the remaining 7% of cases.  
However, respondents suggested that an average 32% of instructions were first introduced to the 
valuer by the borrower and 6% by brokers.   
 
In order to investigate the involvement of borrowers and brokers in the valuer selection process, 
questions were asked concerning the respondents’ views on the probable outcome of a set of 
scenarios similar to those put to the lenders.  The responses are illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. 
 
40% of valuers said that the scenarios concerning brokers did not occur. Taking this into account, 
it is equally likely that the lender will accede to a borrower’s request as to that of a broker.  
However the lender is more likely to instruct a panel valuer than to accept an already prepared 
valuation from one.  If the valuer is not on the lender’s panel then requests to instruct or use 
certain valuers are unlikely to be granted whether from a borrower or broker. 
 
These responses from the valuers indicate a greater likelihood of valuations and recommendations 
being taken up by the lenders than was indicated by the lenders themselves.  However, both 
surveys show that the panel is a vital component of the bank lending valuation process; the 
influence a borrower or broker can have over selection of the valuer is controlled by the panel 
system with lenders quite happy to oblige but only if the valuer is on the panel and has therefore 
already been approved by the lender. 
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Figure 3: Use of existing valuations by lenders 
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Figure 4: Borrower/Broker Involvement in the Selection of the Valuer 
 
 
Information as influence 
Negligence cases 
The role of the purchase price in the lending valuation has been an issue in five of the negligence 
cases.  However, the major issue to arise from the cases is not over-reliance on the purchase price 
but rather under-reliance on it. There is no doubt that judges feel that the purchase price is a very 
important piece of information within the valuation process and should be taken into account. In 
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Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd (1994), one issue was that the 
valuations of certain properties were wildly out of line with the prices at which they had just been 
acquired. The judge suggested that a valuer who fails either to take a recent transaction price into 
account or to explain a marked discrepancy between that price and the valuation, is almost 
certainly guilty of negligence. In this case and in Nyckeln Finance Co. Ltd v Stumpbrook 
Continuation Ltd (1994), the judge also held the lenders guilty of contributory negligence in 
failing to seek an explanation for the discrepancy. 
 
In both Interallianz Finanz AG v Independent Insurance Co Ltd (1997) and Barclays Bank plc v 
William H Brown Ltd (1996), valuers were criticised by judges for not finding out about the 
purchase price. In Arab Bank plc v John D Wood (Commercial) Ltd (1998) the judge said that a 
purchase price should be ignored if there were good reasons for it being out of line with the 
market. In general, however, judges clearly believe that the purchase price is an integral part of 
the information base; they imply that testing the market value against the purchase price should 
be part of the process.  
 
Focus groups 
The valuers’ focus group discussed the role of the purchase price in detail and identified the 
situation where the purchase price changes through the transaction period, sometimes as a result 
of the lending valuation being used in further negotiations with the vendor. The valuers were also 
content with the idea of facilitating the transaction by taking note of the purchase price, and of 
using the distribution of values to justify reasonable movements in the purchase price from an 
initial assessment of value. However, it was clear that some lenders did not give the valuer the 
purchase price in order to get an unbiased view of market value and the valuers further suggested 
that the purchase price information sometimes came to them at a later stage of the process. 
 
Questionnaires 
Lenders’ survey 
Lenders were asked about the information that they give to valuers at the beginning of the 
process.  The majority of lenders inform valuers of the identity of the borrower (87% always or 
usually) and also provide the purchase price where a transaction is occurring (76% always or 
usually).  However, the amount of the loan and other terms of the loan such as duration are 
revealed less often (around 65% always or usually). 
 
Valuers’ survey 
A similar set of questions were put to the valuers.  The respondents said that they are virtually 
always aware of the identity of the borrower and where there is a market transaction in operation, 
71% say they are always or usually given the proposed purchase price.  However, just under half 
of respondents are usually or always given details of the amount of the proposed loan and even 
less (35%) say they are usually or always given other details of the loan such as duration. 
  
Influence on outcomes 
Negligence cases and focus groups 
There is little hard evidence, from either the negligence case database or the focus groups, of 
clients influencing the final valuation figure. Only in two cases have discussions between the 
valuer and another party led to changes being made to the report in its final form.  In  Speshal 
Investments Ltd v Corby Howard Cane Partnership (t/a HBSV) (2003) the party involved was the 
lender.  However in Western Trust & Savings Ltd v Strutt & Parker (1998) the valuer, who had 
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been  instructed by the borrower, had sent a draft valuation to the borrower and then altered it 
before sending the final version to the lender. 
 
The valuers’ focus group, while acknowledging that sending a draft valuation to the client was 
common practice, claimed that resulting discussions were almost invariably about technical issues 
and (sometimes) their presentation, not about the valuation figure itself. However, there was 
evidence that they were prepared to move valuations in the same way as they were willing to 
confirm purchase prices; that is, to use the distribution of values to get to a valuation figure which 
allowed the borrower to obtain the amount required. There is therefore no doubt that the process 
of discussion between stakeholders and clients during the valuation process and the nature of 
valuation distributions does allow for valuation outcomes to be negotiated within certain 
parameters.  
 
Questionnaires 
Lenders’ survey 
There were almost equal numbers of lenders that always or usually discussed the valuation figure 
with the valuer in draft form (40%) as there were that seldom or never did (48%).  There was a 
similar picture for the other elements of the valuation.  However only 4% of lenders suggest the 
valuation figure usually changes and 81% suggest it seldom or never changes. 
 
Valuers’ survey 
The valuers were more inclined to say that they seldom or never discussed the figure (44%) or 
other aspects of the valuation (42%) with the lender, with 26% and 29% respectively saying they 
always or usually discussed these issues.  They denied that the valuation changed:  94% said the 
valuation figured changed seldom or never.  
 
The valuers were even less likely to discuss the valuation figure or other aspects of the valuation 
with the borrower, 77% and 65% respectively saying it seldom or never happened.  The valuers 
were again adamant that any discussions with the borrower did not affect the valuation, with 94% 
saying it seldom or never happened, with those that said it never happened being higher than with 
the lenders at 37% compared with 18%. 
 
There were some interesting differences between the responses concerning borrowers and 
brokers.  Despite a higher non-response rate, a higher proportion of respondents (10% compared 
to 3%) usually discuss the valuation figure with the broker but also a higher proportion never 
discuss it (34% compared to 28%). However, a lower proportion always or usually discusses 
other aspects of the valuation with the broker (7% compared with 11%).  Any resultant changes 
are similarly rare 
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Opinions on influence 
Lenders’ survey 
The lenders were presented with a series of statements on influences with which they were asked 
to agree or disagree (or neither agree nor disagree).  The results are shown in Figure 5.  There is a 
large measure of disagreement with the statements that borrowers or brokers have too much 
influence on the selection or choice of the valuer to be used and around 70% disagree that 
borrowers and brokers have too much influence on the valuation outcome.  The highest level of 
agreement comes with the statement that brokers have too much influence on the selection of 
valuers but this is only 24% of respondents with 19% agreeing borrowers have too much 
influence on selection.  Only between 10% and 15% of respondents think borrowers or brokers 
have too much influence on the outcome.  However, the fact that they are perceived to have any 
influence at all may be adjudged to be a significant problem. 
 
Influence of Borrowers and Brokers
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Selection  too much
involvement borrow ers
Selection  too much
involvement brokers
Inf luence on outcome
borrow ers
Inf luence on outcome
brokers
Agree Neither agree nor disagree Disagree
 
Figure 5 : Influence of borrowers and brokers according to lenders 
 
Valuers’ survey 
Figure 6 illustrates the valuers’ responses to three issues of whether borrowers and brokers have 
too much involvement in the selection of the valuer and whether lenders, borrowers and brokers 
have too much influence on the valuation outcome and apply inappropriate pressure on the 
valuers.  The issues are ordered from the left to show those which elicited the most agreement.  
Influence on outcome is rejected for all three groups.  There is some agreement that borrowers 
and brokers have too much involvement in selection.  However, the most agreement comes for 
the proposition that borrowers and brokers apply inappropriate pressure on valuers. 
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Influence of Lenders, Borrowers and Brokers
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Figure 6: Influence of borrowers. brokers and lenders according to valuers 
 
4. Discussion 
The analysis of the negligence cases shows far greater involvement by borrowers and brokers in 
the selection process than is indicated by the questionnaires.  So this may be a feature of disputed 
valuations distinguishing them from the norm. Whilst it is not possible to ascertain whether this 
aspect contributes to the fate of the valuation, it does raise questions about whether such 
involvement has direct consequences within the process and ultimately on the outcome.  Any 
influence on the outcome is denied by both valuers and lenders, however the valuers do reveal 
that borrowers and brokers apply inappropriate pressure.  It may be hypothesized that the 
involvement of borrowers and brokers in selecting valuers leads to inappropriate pressure on the 
valuers by these parties. 
 
The admission by valuers in the questionnaires to inappropriate pressure from borrowers, brokers 
and, to a lesser extent, lenders, in itself merits further investigation.  The valuers’ focus group did 
highlight the pressure that they felt from brokers; the members of the group were all valuers from 
firms doing a large amount of secured lending valuations and it may be that this type of firm is 
subject to pressures that are not felt in smaller firms.  Therefore the proposition that valuers in 
large firms are subject to more pressure from the various parties than those in smaller firms needs 
testing. 
 
Pressure on valuers may be applied in many ways, not necessarily through overt discussion of the 
valuation.  However it could be expected that there would be a relationship between the 
discussion of the valuation (both the figure and other aspects) and reported pressure.  If there is 
no relationship between these issues then the pressure may be much more subtle. 
 
In order to test these relationships between the involvement of borrowers and brokers in selection, 
discussions of draft valuations, firm size and perceived inappropriate pressure, the valuers’ 
questionnaire responses were further analysed using Chi-squared tests. 
 
The results of these tests are set out at Appendix Two and summarised below. 
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There is no statistical association between the amount of business introduced to the valuer by the 
borrower and the valuer’s opinion on whether borrowers apply inappropriate pressure.  This does 
not entirely rule out a relationship as it may be that, in responding to the question on pressure, 
valuers have in mind a minority of cases.  However it does suggest that borrowers do not have to 
be involved in selection to apply pressure. 
 
At first sight there is a strong association between the amount of business introduced by brokers 
and the valuer’s opinion on whether brokers apply inappropriate pressure.  However the result is 
influenced by the valuers who get no work from borrowers and who, understandably, neither 
agree nor disagree with the assertion.  Once those valuers who get no work from brokers are 
excluded the p value is 0.058. 
 
The only statistical association regarding the size of the firm is with the opinions on brokers 
applying inappropriate pressure.  However, larger firms are simply more opinionated than small 
ones as they agree and disagree with the statement more than would be expected by chance.  
More smaller firms responded neutrally to the statement than would be expected.   However, as 
smaller firms have significantly less involvement with brokers than the large ones this is perhaps 
not surprising.  
 
There is no association between the amount of discussions that valuers have with lenders, 
borrowers or brokers and their perception of inappropriate pressure from these parties.  Again this 
does not entirely rule out a relationship, valuers may have in mind a minority of cases when 
responding to the question on pressure but it does suggest that pressure is being applied in other 
ways than through overt discussions 
 
5.  Conclusions 
The overall aim of this paper was to examine the bank lending valuation process and to identify 
any threats to transparency and objectivity. The objectives of the paper were to examine a number 
of questions concerning the possibility of influence on the valuer from clients and other parties 
(borrowers, brokers and lenders) who have a stake in the outcome.  
 
The issue of influence on the valuer is a major one for this research. Influence can be overt, in the 
form of pressure from other parties; it can also be covert and self-induced.  The valuer can, with 
or without pressure from interested parties, decide to assess whether the price is within an 
acceptable margin of error, and may feel that confirmation of a reasonable price is the real task of 
the process. Whether this should indeed be the true basis of the task is a legitimate question for 
the bank lending valuation process. 
 
The strongest evidence of overt influence on the process comes from the method of valuer 
selection. The ideal position, as discussed in the valuers’ focus group, is for the valuer to be 
selected, paid by and report to the lender. The borrower and broker should play no part in this 
process, but evidence from both the cases and the focus groups is that they are heavily involved, 
especially in larger cases “over £1 million”. The valuers’ focus group acknowledged that they 
needed to maintain professional integrity, but were also aware of the importance of brokers and 
borrowers in initiating and securing loan business. They were clearly much more comfortable 
with borrower involvement than with broker involvement in their selection. This was at least 
partly because brokers tended to be extremely active in following a transaction through from 
beginning to end; they would sometimes put pressure on valuers not to inhibit the deal.  Their 
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major objective is to broker the deal and they have little interest in the longer term validity of the 
transaction. 
 
The lenders survey implied that borrowers and brokers were not involved in selection to any great 
extent although the valuers surveyed suggested one third of their instructions involved borrowers.  
It is clear that great store is placed by the lenders on the panel system.  Lenders are relatively 
amenable to selection by borrowers or brokers from their panel, particularly to borrowers who ask 
for a specific valuer.  This suggests lenders have faith in their own vetting systems and in the 
integrity of valuers. 
 
There has been much discussion in recent years concerning client influence on various aspects of 
the operation of the property market; in this context, a more appropriate terminology would be 
influence by interested parties or stakeholders in the transaction. Only in two negligence cases is 
there actual evidence of a draft valuation sent to a borrower being altered before a final version is 
sent to the lender. But the discussion with valuers suggests that some level of influence is applied 
by borrowers/brokers even when the instructing party is the lender.  
 
The responses to the questionnaire statements on influence are revealing.  Valuers say that 
borrowers and brokers attempt to influence them but that pressure is resisted and has no influence 
on the outcome.  However, it would clearly be difficult for valuers to admit to bowing to such 
pressures. There is no apparent part of the valuation process that leads one third of valuers to feel 
that inappropriate pressure is being applied by borrowers and brokers.  It may be that the pressure 
comes from the agency-client and other business pressures identified in the work of other 
researchers.   
 
Two areas are highlighted for further investigation.  The first is the panel system employed by 
lenders as a quality control mechanism and which underpins the whole process.  There are 
questions raised both about the processes used by individual lenders for admitting valuers to their 
panels and also about how valuers ensure that they remain on the panel.  The second area 
concerns the pressure coming from borrowers and brokers.  This has not been linked to any 
specific part of the valuation process, however, the valuation process as it stands clearly does not 
dispel these feelings of being pressured.  This begs the question of if and how it could.  Exploring 
these two issues is particularly important in the context of the changing banking regulatory 
framework.  Under the new EU/Basel capital adequacy rules, the independence of the valuer has 
a key role to play in reducing the capital that a lender has to hold.  It is therefore important that 
the panel and valuation systems are seen to be transparent and to foster objectivity in the 
valuation outcome. 
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Appendix One – Questions and Responses 
 
Lender Survey 
 
Table 1 : Selection of the Valuer – Involvement of Borrowers/Brokers 
 Always Usually
Half the 
time Seldom Never NR 
How often is the valuer chosen by a borrower 
or broker? 3% 11% 14% 46% 27% 0% 
 
Table 2 : Selection of the Valuer – Use of Panel/Non-Panel Valuers and their Valuations 
Please indicate how you respond in the 
following circumstances.  If the situation 
never occurs, then please tick the ‘Does 
not occur’ box: 
Always Usually Half the time Seldom Never 
Does not 
occur NR
If a borrower brings us a full valuation from 
a panel valuer we will use it  6% 41% 6% 19% 16% 11% 0%
If a borrower brings us a full valuation from 
a non-panel valuer we will use it  0% 0% 1% 37% 51% 10% 1%
If a borrower asks for a particular panel 
valuer, we will appoint that valuer 9% 49% 19% 15% 4% 4% 0%
d) If a borrower asks for a particular non-
panel valuer, we will appoint that valuer 0% 0% 5% 38% 51% 5% 1%
        
If a broker brings us a full valuation from a 
panel valuer we will use it  4% 32% 6% 14% 19% 25% 0%
If a broker brings us a full valuation from a 
non-panel valuer we will use it  0% 0% 0% 28% 49% 22% 1%
If a broker asks for a particular panel valuer, 
we will appoint that valuer 4% 43% 16% 9% 6% 22% 0%
If a broker asks for a particular non-panel 
valuer, we will appoint that valuer 0% 0% 5% 28% 44% 22% 6%
 
Table 3 : Information Flow at Beginning of the Valuation 
 Always Usually Half the time Seldom Never NR
We inform the valuer of the amount of the proposed 
loan 41% 24% 9% 16% 10% 0%
We inform the valuer of the other terms of the loan 
(such as duration) 35% 29% 5% 16% 14% 0%
We inform the valuer of the identity of the borrower 63% 24% 3% 6% 4% 0%
Where property has just been, or is being purchased, 
we inform the valuer of the agreed price 43% 33% 6% 10% 8% 0%
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Table 4 : Information Flow Between Lender and Valuer During the Valuation 
 Always Usually Half the time Seldom Never NR 
We discuss the valuation figure with the valuer 
whilst the valuation is in draft form 10% 30% 22% 34% 4% 0% 
We discuss aspects of the valuation, other than the 
figure, with the valuer whilst the valuation is in draft 
form 
10% 25% 25% 34% 5% 0% 
Where we have discussions on the draft valuation 
with the valuer, the valuation figure changes as a 
result 
0% 4% 14% 65% 16% 1% 
 
Table 5 : Opinions of Lenders 
 Strongly agree Agree
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly disagree NR
Borrowers have too much involvement in the 
choice of valuers 
0% 19% 20% 43% 16% 1%
Brokers have too much involvement in the 
choice of valuers 
3% 22% 18% 37% 20% 1%
Valuers undertake valuations without 
declaring conflicts of interest 
0% 16% 13% 46% 25% 0%
The extent of valuers’ conflict of interests is a 
problem to lenders 
4% 19% 28% 42% 6% 1%
Borrowers have too much influence on the 
valuation outcome 
0% 10% 14% 53% 23% 0%
Brokers have too much influence on the 
valuation outcome 
1% 13% 16% 43% 25% 1%
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Valuer survey 
Table 1 : Selection of the Valuer  
 Always Usually Half the 
time 
Seldom Never Does not 
occur 
NR 
If a borrower gives the lender a full 
valuation from me, and I am on the 
lender’s panel, it will be used 
14% 47% 7% 12% 2% 14% 4% 
If a borrower gives the lender a full 
valuation from me, and I am not on the 
lender’s panel, it will be used 
0% 9% 18% 43% 9% 16% 3% 
If a borrower asks for me, and I am on the 
panel, the lender will appoint me 14% 61% 15% 3% 0% 5% 3% 
If a borrower asks for me, and I am not on 
the panel, the lender will appoint me 1% 3% 21% 56% 7% 10% 3% 
If a broker gives the lender a full valuation 
from me, and I am on the lender’s panel, it 
will be used 
7% 38% 8% 4% 1% 39% 3% 
If a broker gives the lender a full valuation 
from me, and I am not on the lender’s 
panel, it will be used 
1% 3% 9% 35% 6% 43% 3% 
If a broker asks for me, and I am on the 
panel, the lender will appoint me 8% 41% 11% 7% 0% 31% 3% 
If a broker asks for me, and I am not on the 
panel, the lender will appoint me 0% 1% 13% 39% 5% 39% 3% 
 
Table 2 : Information Flow at Beginning of Valuation 
 Always Usually Half the time Seldom Never NR
We are informed of the amount of the proposed loan 3% 46% 28% 22% 2% 0%
We are informed of the other terms of the loan (such as 
duration) 2% 33% 35% 28% 3% 0%
We are informed of the identity of the borrower 53% 47% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Where property has just been, or is being purchased, 
we are informed of the agreed price 9% 62% 20% 8% 1% 0%
 
Table 3 : Information Flow Between Valuer and Lender During the Valuation 
 Always Usually Half the time Seldom Never NR 
We discuss the valuation figure with the lender 
whilst the valuation is in draft form. 3% 23% 30% 39% 5% 0% 
We discuss aspects of the valuation, other than 
the figure, with the lender whilst the valuation is 
in draft form. 
3% 26% 28% 39% 3% 0% 
Where we have discussions with the lender on the 
draft valuation the valuation figure changes as a 
result. 
0% 1% 5% 76% 18% 1% 
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Table 4 : Information Flow Between Valuer and Borrower During the Valuation 
 Always Usually Half the time Seldom Never NR 
We discuss the valuation figure with the borrower 
whilst the valuation is in draft form 1% 2% 18% 49% 28% 1% 
We discuss aspects of the valuation, other than 
the figure, with the borrower whilst the valuation 
is in draft form 
1% 10% 24% 49% 15% 1% 
Where we have discussions with the borrower on 
the draft valuation, the valuation figure changes 
as a result 
0% 1% 3% 57% 37% 2% 
 
 
Table 5 : Information Flow Between Valuer and Broker During the Valuation 
 Always Usually Half the time Seldom Never NR 
We discuss the valuation figure with the broker 
whilst the valuation is in draft form 0% 10% 7% 32% 34% 17% 
We discuss aspects of the valuation, other than 
the figure, with the broker whilst the valuation is 
in draft form 
0% 7% 8% 34% 33% 18% 
Where we have discussions with the broker on
the draft valuation, the valuation figure changes
as a result 
0% 1% 1% 37% 44% 17% 
 
Table 6 : Opinions of Valuers 
 
Strongly 
agree Agree
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree Disagree
Strongly 
disagree NR
 Borrowers have too much involvement in the 
choice of valuers 5% 13% 49% 28% 5% 0%
 Brokers have too much involvement in the choice 
of valuers 4% 13% 58% 22% 2% 1%
 Borrowers have too much influence on the 
valuation outcome 2% 4% 29% 47% 18% 0%
 Brokers have too much influence on the valuation 
outcome 2% 3% 34% 40% 19% 2%
 Lenders have too much influence on the valuation 
outcome 1% 6% 32% 55% 5% 1%
 Borrowers apply inappropriate pressure on valuers 6% 29% 39% 22% 1% 3%
 Brokers apply inappropriate pressure on valuers 6% 25% 46% 19% 2% 2%
 Lenders apply inappropriate pressure on valuers 3% 14% 42% 36% 3% 1%
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Appendix Two: Cross-tabulations and Chi squared test results 
 
 Discussing the valuation figure  
Lenders applying inappropriate 
pressure 
Never/Seldom Half the Time Always/Usually Total 
Disagree 28 15 17 60 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 26 21 17 64 
Agree 11 10 5 26 
Total 65 46 39 150 
  Chi Squared test p value 0.72 
     
 Discussing other issues with the valuation  
Lenders applying inappropriate 
pressure 
Never/Seldom Half the Time Always/Usually  
Disagree 24 18 18 60 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 27 19 18 64 
Agree 12 6 8 26 
Total 63 43 44 150 
  Chi Squared test p value 0.97 
     
 Discussing the valuation figure  
Borrower applying 
inappropriate pressure 
Never/Seldom Half the Time Always/Usually  
Disagree 29 5 1 35 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 47 10 2 59 
Agree 39 12 2 53 
Total 115 27 5 147 
  Chi Squared test p value 0.88 
     
 Discussing other issues with the valuation  
Borrower applying 
inappropriate pressure 
Never/Seldom Half the Time Always/Usually  
Disagree 25 5 4 34 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 39 15 5 59 
Agree 31 15 7 53 
Total 95 35 16 146 
  Chi Squared test p value 0.55 
     
 Discussing the valuation figure  
Broker applying inappropriate 
pressure 
Never/Seldom Half the Time Always/Usually  
Disagree 23 3 6 32 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 45 4 21 70 
Agree 32 3 12 47 
Total 100 10 39 149 
  Chi Squared test p value 0.79 
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 Discussing other issues with the valuation  
Broker applying inappropriate 
pressure 
Never/Seldom Half the Time Always/Usually  
Disagree 23 3 6 32 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 46 4 20 70 
Agree 32 5 10 47 
Total 101 12 36 149 
  Chi Squared test p value 0.70 
 
 Amount of business introduced by Borrowers   
Borrower applying 
inappropriate pressure Less than 10% 10% to 20% 21% to 50% Over 50% Total 
Disagree 9 15 5 6 35 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 14 14 14 10 52 
Agree 12 16 7 17 52 
Total 35 45 26 33 139 
  Chi Squared test p value 0.26 
 Amount of business introduced by Brokers  
Broker applying inappropriate 
pressure  0% Less than 10% 10%+  
Disagree  6 15 8 29 
Neither Agree nor Disagree  29 19 10 58 
Agree  10 11 18 39 
Total  45 45 36 126 
  Chi Squared test p value 0.003** 
 
 Number of valuations per respondent firm 
Broker applying inappropriate pressure Up to 30 31 to 100 Over 100 Total 
Disagree 9 10 13 32 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 27 28 11 66 
Agree 15 12 18 45 
Total 51 50 42 143 
 Chi Squared test p value 0.042*
     
Borrower applying inappropriate pressure Up to 30 31 to 100 Over 100 Total 
Disagree 9 13 13 35 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 20 24 12 56 
Agree 22 12 16 50 
Total 51 49 41 141 
 Chi Squared test p value 0.15 
     
Lender applying inappropriate pressure Up to 30 31 to 100 Over 100 Total 
Disagree 17 22 19 58 
Neither Agree nor Disagree 23 24 15 62 
Agree 11 4 8 23 
Total 51 50 42 143 
 Chi Squared test p value 0.28 
 
